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The US and Philippines, though allies for some time now, have not had such an 
easy relationship historically. Since the Philippine-American war broke out and 
until the American colonization of the Philippines had ended, the two countries 
had a complicated relationship since then. The US, through their official 
development assistance, has been helping the Philippines with various peace 
and security measures to appease the internal conflict with separatist groups. 
Since the Philippine constitution disallows foreign troops from participating in 
actual combat on its soil, US has been helping the Philippines military in an 
advisory and training role. Moreover, The USAID has been implementing 
projects in these conflict zones in Mindanao, Philippines, especially after the 
global war on terror. This paper explores the US’ increasing role in Philippines’ 
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1.1. Background of the Study  
 
The Philippines, despite middle-income status and recent economic growth, is 
increasingly experiencing uneven economic conditions across geographic divisions. 
Some parts of the country resemble a failing state rather than a middle-income country.  
Mindanao is an island group located in the south of the Philippines. It is the 
country’s second biggest island, with a population of approximately 24.1 
million. 
 
 Mindanao has been called the Land of Promise since it is abundant in natural 
commodities of the country which originate from the region. Mindanao also holds 
70% of the Philippines' mineral resources which includes precious metals
1
.  
This abundance, however, has not translated into Mindanao’s development. The 
region’s development has been affected by protracted armed conflict. The conflict has 
resulted to one of the highest levels of violence in the ASEAN region which has 
resulted to the least levels of development in the country. The conflict has not only 
affected the region’s development, but has disrupted the lives of the people˗ ˗  costing 
lives, or forcing them to seek refuge and safety away from their homes. The protracted 
nature of the conflict has limited the people’s access to basic services that has placed 
them under the poverty trap. The effects of warring sides also come in the form of 
hunger and malnutrition. In 2014, out of the 16 poorest provinces in the Philippines, 10 
                                                        
1
 Metals such as gold, copper, chromite, lead, nickel, manganese, silver, zinc, and iron ore are 
present in Mindanao. 
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Approximately 20.44% of the total population of Mindanao adheres to the 
religion of Islam, making it the only island in the predominantly Catholic country with 
a significant Muslim populace. A more recent estimate from a 2011 survey by the 
National Commission on Muslim Filipinos indicates that there are as many as 10.3 
million Muslims in the country, comprising 11% of the total population. On the whole, 
94% of the country’s Muslims live in Mindanao. The population used to be 
predominantly Islam, but, series of migration from neighboring islands due to 
government policies have dwindled the Islam population down to 20%. Mindanao is 
also home to 18 ethnolinguistic groups or Lumads
3
.  
In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), most of the affected areas 
have the worst levels in the country, with a status comparable to that of sub-Saharan 
states. Government spending for education and basic services has been inadequate over 
time, hence, certain groups in Mindanao have felt excluded by the capital. Policies that 
directly affect them (migration) politically and economically excluded. A long history 
of colonization, competition for resources, and arguable government policies has led to 
violent conflict.  
 
                                                        
2
 Based on the recent Food Security and Nutrition Analysis of the Integrated Food Security 
Phase Classification 
3
 Lumad is a local word that literally means indigenous people. It is a self-ascribed identity of 
the indigenous people of Mindanao. 
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The conflict areas are afflicted with recurrent humanitarian crises. In total, 3.5 
million people have been displaced since 2000 and tens of thousands of people have 
been killed. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have estimated between 
140,000 to 220,000 fatalities brought about by the conflict. Further, about USD 24 
billion had been spent from 1969-2004 in terms of military expenditures alone.  
According to the UNDP, the Philippine economy is affected with an estimated USD 
17.5 billion in losses to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
 
The Philippines has been classified with very high warning category by the 
Fund for Peace
4
 in its State Fragility Index. The conflict is considered intra-state, 
wherein the conflict is confined within the borders of the country. However, the 
conflict has been increasingly internationalized in terms of its participants. The conflict 
has affected the security in the region and has caused those affected to seek refuge in 
other countries. 
  
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has been open to 
international assistance to obtain peace and development in Mindanao. Furthermore, 
the GRP has undertaken several peace processes and has enacted a special autonomous 
region for Muslim Mindanao. Despite the extensive and large flow of aid to address the 
conflict, the Mindanao conflict environment has not improved.  
                                                        
4
 Fund for peace is a leader in the conflict. The organization assessed the countries according to 
12 indicators encompassing the following areas: social, economic, political and military. The 
Philippines measured poor in 3 indicators, weak in 7, moderate in 2 areas. 
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There are various aid donors currently operating in the conflict-affected areas, 
such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Japan 
International cooperation Agency (JICA), United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and World Bank (WB), among others. These aid donors fund 
programs and operate in the subnational conflict area to directly work on conflict 
issues. The USAID has been the longest aid actor that had been operating in Mindanao. 
Moreover, the US already has an extensive history of operating in Mindanao prior to 
the start of their aid operations. The US  has been operating in Mindanao since 1899, 
following the signing of the Treaty of Paris until the end of their colonial rule. USAID 
has implemented projects in Mindanao as early as late 1970s. Following the September 
11 (9/11) terrorist attacks, the US launched their Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
which prompted the deployment of US troops in the Philippines after reports that Al-
Qaeda affiliated groups were providing training for terrorists in Mindanao. 
1.2. Research Question 
 
Given the extensive history of Philippine-American relations, the study 
focused on US interventions. This study examined the United States’ role in the 
conflict throughout history. The study looked into the US policies from their colonial 
rule up to their current development and military assistance to the conflict-affected 
areas in order to find out whether their participation has supported transition from 
insecurity to peace. Further to find out in what ways they have been present to achieve 
peace and development through their programs. The study aims to find out how the US 
5 
 
allocated its aid in response to the conflict and how US addressed the conflict. 
Moreover, the underlying issues that have sustained the conflict which have made aid 






















II. Review of Related Literature 
 
The assumption that foreign aid, in itself, is an instrument of foreign policy is a 
subject of controversy (Morgenthau, 1962).
5
 Even more so, when such instruments are 
applied in a sensitive setting such as conflict areas. According to Beall et al., donors 
view assistance in conflict areas in two ways. The first view is that the pursuit of 
progress in the developing countries as a tool of foreign policy to achieve sustainable 
security ‘at home while the other view is that economic development in those countries 
depends on security.
6
 This suggests that, it is the donor’s view that domestic security is 
inextricably linked to security outside its territory. Further, in order to ensure its 
domestic security, pursuing economic development abroad is a means to achieve such 
and that the state of security determines a country’s development. Development and 
security are thus viewed by donors as closely related concepts, directly causing or 
affecting the other. Achieving peace abroad has now become a vital objective of their 
development aid. However, this claim somehow lacks any explanation that directly 
links the two. Literature on conflict and development are mostly concerned how the 
presence of conflict can affect growth rates of economy rather than how conflict affects 
development. However, what is made clear is that, foreign aid policies are formulated 
in consideration of both domestic and international political circumstances. Lancaster 
(2007) identified ideas, political institutions, interests and, organization of aid as the 
                                                        
5
 Hans Morgenthau (1962), The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 301-309 
6
 Beall, Jo and Goodfellow, Thomas and Putzel, James (2006). Introductory article: on the 




domestic political forces which affects the foreign policies. Lancaster further argues 
that the purposes of aid will change if domestic political forces respond to the changes 
in international structure.
 7
 Alesina and Dollar (2000) have also found that international 
political factors are crucial in allocating aid.
8
   
 
During the Cold War, much of US assistance were within a security 
framework to the containment of communism. The Truman Doctrine of 1947, which 
provided both military and economic aid to Turkey and Greece, was utilized by the US 
to contain communism. The US in 1951 passed The Mutual Security Act that was 
envisioned to combine economic and military programs, and technical assistance. 
Through the Mutual Security Agency, the US implemented its foreign policy, 
especially to its former colonies by providing aid.
9
  Provision of foreign aid to former 
colonies is still relevant in analyzing aid flows and aid allocation. As much as looking 
into normative characteristics of aid, strategic interests should also be considered as 
well. After the September 11 attacks, national security is again the forefront of US 
foreign policy. For Balla and Reinhardt (2008), how the donor perceives of the conflict 
will determine how beneficial the aid will be at attaining its interests. Further, that 
                                                        
7
 Lancaster, Carol (2007), Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, p. 212-
226. 
8
 Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David (2000). “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” 
Journal of Economic Growth, p. 33-63. 
9
 Merrill, D. (2006), The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity. 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, p. 27–37 
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conflict has the tendency to alter aid’s effectiveness which can cause the donor to 




Fleck and Kilby (2010) made comparisons on the consequential aid policies of 
the different geopolitical considerations during the Cold War era and the GWOT era. 
They observed that from the mid-1990s until the GWOT, the importance of the 
recipient’s need for aid had decreased while the probability that a higher income 




 emphasized that 
the Bush administration changed major US aid policies to adapt to their war on terror. 
The US aid policy now preferred those countries whose governments promote 
development and democracy. There is now a focus on selectivity of partner countries 
that have preferred institutional quality rather than needs-based approach. Fleck and 
Kilby (2010) also found that while the US aid has increased its aid budget for GWOT, 
the same had been observed for aid to poor countries with less geopolitical importance.  
 
In their study of U.S. aid allocation, Demierl-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009)
13
 also 
confirmed this shift of the pattern of allocation. They found that during the Cold War, 
economic development was the most significant consideration in allocating US aid as 
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 Balla, Eliana and Reinhardt, Gina Yannitell (2008). Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does 
Conflict Count? World Development, p. 2566-2585. 
11
 Fleck, Robert and Kilby, Christopher (2010), Changing Aid Regimes? US Foreign Aid from 
the Cold War to the War on Terror, Journal of Development Economics, p. 185-197. 
12
 Lancaster, Carol (2008). George Bush's Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos? Center for 
Global Development 
13
 Demirel-Pegg, Tijen and Moskowitz, James (2009). “US Aid Allocation: The Nexus of 
Human Rights, Democracy, and Development.” Journal of Peace Research, p. 181-198. 
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opposed to strategic interests (i.e., regime type, bilateral trade relations). Further, after 
the Cold War era, countries that have low economic development and transitioning 




 studied the US aid initiatives in the Philippines that have 
attempted to accomplish non-economic ends through the economic assistance. He 
found that the principal economic goals were distorted by non-economic goals.  The 
prioritization of the non-economic objectives (including perceived prioritization) not 
only distorted the economic program but also prevented support for some parts of the 
program. Preeg argued that the failure to formulate a sound, transparent, and 
achievable objectives for US to uphold, could lead to doing more harm than good for 
its overall objectives. Burnett (1992)
15
 analyzed Preeg’s study together with other case 
studies and found that far-reaching objectives (i.e., security and political) could 
undermine the achievement of its economic objectives. The case studies also highlight 
that the donor-recipient relationship of their alignment of goals. When U.S. objectives 
conflicted with the recipient’s interests, a political struggle could ensue in the recipient 
country and consequently diminish the aid’s purposes.  Burnett also found that these 
economic and military assistance were successful in winning the cold war. Moreover, 
                                                        
14
 Preeg, Ernest H. (1991).  Neither Fish nor Fowl: U.S. Economic Aid to the Philippines for 
Non-economic objectives, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
15
 Burnett, Stanton (1992), Investing in Security: Economic Aid for Non-Economic Purposes, 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
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that it is inevitable for policymakers to attempt achieving non-economic goals with 























III. Analytical Framework 
 
3.1. Methodology and Hypothesis 
 
The research looked into the US patterns of aid allocation in relation to the 
conflict, within the context of aid securitization. The US has promoted development as 
a national security tool that is founded on the development and security nexus. 
Historically, the US has utilized aid for fostering security while satisfying its national 
interests. The US utilized development as a legitimate tool for diplomacy where 
interests of their national security is threatened. On the other hand, conflict areas are 
characterized as places with poor governance and corruption issues, which in the 
context of development aid, has been argued to hamper aid’s effectiveness. The 
securitization of aid went beyond the conventional role of aid and without 
understanding its limitations, can create inefficiencies and affect trustworthiness of its 
aid in the future. 
 
  
For Jervis (1978) cooperation under the security dilemma can be difficult since 
there are no institutions or authorities that have the power to create and enforce 
international laws. While cooperation can benefit, the lack of it however, can ensue the 
opposite as anarchy encourages states to maintain the status quo. The links of domestic 
and foreign policy or the domestic politics of two states, and its quest for security may 
drive states to interfere in the domestic politics of others. States pursue actions to 
12 
 
protect themselves through seeking control, or at least neutralize, areas on their borders. 
He further identified scenarios where cooperation is likely to be enhanced by means of 
increasing the gains from mutual cooperation, decreasing the gains from defection, or 
increasing the expectations that both sides will cooperate. Moreover, the perceived 
collective security also reduces a country's perception of threat and its need to 
immediately respond to another’s actions. Gains from exploitation of a second country 
is reduced when the second country is both non-threatening and is able to provide 




The OECD defines bilateral transactions as those undertaken by a donor 
country directly with a developing country. Bilateral aid is thought to be easily affected 
by interests, particularly, political gain of the donor and even commercial interests/gain. 
The research employed qualitative analysis to study the US development assistance 
programs for the purposes of achieving peace and development in Mindanao. The 
research analyzed US development assistance flows labelled under the “150” DAC 
sector code named “Government and civil society”. This sector has two sub-categories 
which are “Government and civil society, general” and “Conflict prevention and 
resolution, peace and security” which are further divided into 17 subcategories.
17
 Flows 
classified under governance were included because some flows under these category 
                                                        
16
 Jervis, Robert (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30: 167-214. 
17
ECD-DAC. Purpose Codes: sector classification. 




supported the objectives under the conflict prevention and resolution, peace and 
security sector. Assistance under these categories were analyzed together with US 
strategies as stated in the Country Partnership Information that had been released by 
the USAID. USAID, is the lead agency within the US government responsible for 
giving development assistance. Moreover, the study analyzed aid disbursements for 
these categories to find out how USAID had disbursed its aid under the mentioned 
purposes that addresses security issue within its framework of country’s policies and 
programs. The study utilized statistical methods in analyzing violence data from the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program and aid flows from the USAID. The study utilized 
qualitative historical research in explaining the roots of conflict.  
 
The study hypothesizes that US aid for the Mindanao conflict were aligned to 
pursue its own national interests of security and that Philippines’ security issues were 











IV. Historical Analysis of the Mindanao Conflict 
 
4.1. Spanish Colonial Period (1521-1898) 
 
Indigenous peoples have been living in Mindanao as early as 500 BC. In the 
14
th
 century, Arab traders brought Islam to the region and missionaries from Malaysia 
strengthened the Islamic religion throughout the 15
th
 to early 16
th
 century. When the 
Spanish arrived in the16th century in Mindanao, the native Moro population were 
already organized in the form of sultanates. From Central Philippines, Spain extended 
their sovereignty to the Northern Philippines and attempted to do the same to the 
Southern region.  Spain would send several expeditions to the Philippines over the next 
decades until 1565 when Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, who became the first royal 
governor of Cebu, was finally able to create a permanent Spanish settlement.
18
 Legazpi 
named the islands, "Felipinas" in honor of King Philip II of Spain. The Spaniards 
sought to convert the Filipinos from their pagan beliefs to an organized religion. 
Success could be attributed to the fact that most in the north did not practice any 
organized religion at the time. 
 
The colonizers constantly attempted to conquer and convert the people to 
Christianity which generated a series of inter-religious conflicts. They referred to the 
Islamic inhabitants of Mindanao as ‘Moros’, after the Moors that they have defeated in 
                                                        




Spain. The term ‘Moro’ refers to political identity that is distinct to the Islamic people 
of Mindanao. The Spanish used ‘Moro’ as a derogatory term, like ‘Indio’ for Filipinos 
whom they converted to Christianity (San Juan, 2008). 
 
  The Spanish captured the city of Jolo, the seat of the Sultanate of Sulu, in 
1876 after several unsuccessful attempts. In order to prevent further bloodshed and 
destruction of Jolo, on July 22, 1878, the Sultan of Sulu signed the Spanish Treaty of 
Peace. There were several translation issues with the Spanish and Tausug
19
 versions of 
the treaty. The Tausug version provides that the Sulu Sultanate will be a protectorate of 
Spain and would still maintain its autonomy. The Spanish version of the Treaty, 
however, allows them to have sovereignty over the whole Sulu archipelago.  There 
were various peace treaties signed during the Spanish occupation, but the Spanish 
Treaty of Peace was the last signed between the Sultan and the Spain. The treaty 
permitted the Spanish forces to put up a garrison in Jolo. The translation flaws of the 
treaty would later have critical implications in the Mindanao’s inclusion in the 
Philippines’ cession to the U.S.  
The Philippine revolution
20
 in 1896, led by Andrés Bonifacio
21
, sought 
independence from Spain after three hundred years of colonial rule.  The Katipunan
22
 
fought Spain through an armed uprising. The Katipunan’s influence spread throughout 
                                                        
19 The language used in Jolo 
20 Prior to the revolution, there were numerous rebellions all over the Philippines 




the Philippines and successfully organized a revolutionary government which led to 
declaring a nationwide armed revolution. Although the Katipunan’s attack to control 
the capital failed, it sparked a series of revolts in the other provinces. A power struggle 
in the Katipunan led to Bonifacio's death in 1897 that transferred the leadership to 
Emilio Aguinaldo, who led his own revolutionary government. In the same year, the 
Pact of Biak-na-Bato
23
 was signed between the Katipunan and Spain in order to reduce 
hostilities, but, it never truly ceased. 
 
The revolution coincided with the Spanish-American war which started on 
April 21, 1898 when the U.S. launched a naval blockade of Cuba. The U.S.’s war with 
Spain ultimately expanded to the Philippines. The Philippine revolution gained control 
most of the country by June 1898. The success of the revolution prompted Aguinaldo 
to declare independence on June 12, 1898 which signified the end of the revolution. 
However, both Spain and U.S. did not recognize the Philippines’ independence.  
 
The U.S. Navy's Asiatic Squadron defeated the Spanish navy in the Battle of 
Manila Bay, seizing control of Manila on May 1, 1898. The battle is sometimes 
referred to as the "Mock Battle of Manila"
 
because the local Spanish and American 
generals secretly planned the battle to transfer control of the city from the Spanish to 
                                                        
23 República de Biac-na-Bató was the first republic ever declared in the Philippines by the 
revolutionaries led by Emilio Aguinaldo.   
17 
 
the Americans while keeping the revolutionaries outside Manila.  Spain’s forces were 
beaten by the Filipino and American troops on the ground. The Filipino revolutionaries’ 
hope for independence was snatched when U.S. and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris. 
The Treaty signified the end of Spanish-American War and the U.S. purchased the 
Philippines for $20 million. While Spain’s presence in Mindanao were limited to a few 
garrisons and never governed the people under the Spanish crown, Spain still claimed 
rights on the whole Mindanao. Even with Spain’s minimal claim, Mindanao was 
included in the territories that were ceded to the U.S.  
4.2. US Occupation (1898-1946) 
 
Following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War, the Philippines 
was ceded to the U.S. by virtue of the Treaty of Paris which was signed in December 
1898. The Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded Puerto Rico and Guam to the US, while Cuba 
was placed under a U.S. protectorate. The Philippines, including territories that were 
not full control of Spain, were also sold to the US for USD 20 million.
24
 The Spaniards 
then were limited to a few coastal garrisons and never got full control of Mindanao, but 
the translation flaws of the Spain’s Treaty of Peace with the Sultan gave way to their 
inclusion in the Treaty of Paris. It was only in May 1899 that the U.S. took over the 
Spanish fort in Jolo and later the Zamboanga fort in December 1899.
 
The Moro resisted 
and continued their struggle to their new colonizers, which lasted for four decades.  
 
                                                        
24 On November 7, 1900 the U.S. paid an additional $100,000 to Spain in order to include 
in the 1898 cession the Sulu islands  
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On December 21, 1898, President McKinley proclaimed “Benevolent 
Assimilation” as the U.S. colonial policy towards the Philippines. In this declaration, 
President McKinley announced US intentions to establish control over the Philippines 
by using what they considered a gentle policy.
25
  The Schurman Commission, 
appointed by President McKinley, concluded that the Filipinos had aspirations for 
independence, but were not ready for it yet. Feeling betrayed, this led to the 
Philippines' Second War of Independence in 1899. This war, which the U.S. called the 
Philippine Insurrection, lasted for two years. 
 
Then Sultan Kiram expected to regain independence after the defeat of Spain, 
however, the US government relayed to the Sultan that the old treaty with Spain will 
be enforced. However, Sultan Kiram demanded a new treaty be negotiated arguing that 
they are a different entity from Spain. The U.S. together with the Sulu Sultanate signed 
the Bates Treaty which guaranteed the latter’s autonomy in its internal affairs. At the 
same time, the Bates Treaty made certain that the Sultanate will remain neutral to the 
Philippine–American War. However, the wrong translations from the earlier Spanish 
Treaty of Peace were retained, which positioned the Sultanate under a complete 
dependency rather than a protectorate.  
The U.S. imposed a direct rule of Mindanao under their colonial government. 
The colonial government adopted a policy of attraction in the Philippines and 
                                                        
25 S.C. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903, 
(New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1982). 
19 
 





The US colonial government declared all unoccupied 
lands as public lands which had resulted to migration of non-Muslim Filipinos from the 
North and American businesses to invest in Mindanao.  Soon after these policies were 
implemented, the Moro Rebellion broke out and the peace through the Bates Treaty 
was not sustained. Further aggravating the Moro population was the imposition of a 
secular education system. Muslim parents refused to let their children attend the 
secular schools which led to significant illiteracy.  
The U.S. colonial government aimed to integrate Mindanao with the rest of the 
Northern Philippines. The U.S. encouraged other Filipinos, particularly the non-
Muslims, to move to Mindanao. They provided loans and acres of land were provided. 
Around 40 to 200 acres of land were granted to the settlers during 1903-1906. The U.S. 
colonial government passed several land laws starting from 1902, the Land 
Registration Act was enacted to assess the extent of private lands. Other laws 
pertaining to land soon followed, such as the Public Lands Acts of 1905, 1913, 1914, 
and 1919, which provided for registration of land ownership and the unclaimed lands 
as state property. Although private ownership of state land was still possible, these 
laws were disproportionate to the Muslims. In particular, the Land Act of 1919 permits 
a Christian Filipino to apply for private ownership of up to 24 hectares, whereas a non-
                                                        




Christian could request only 10.
27
 The policies led to a legitimized land grabbing in 
Mindanao, which dispossessed the Mindanao people of their ancestral lands. Finally, 
the government encouraged foreign corporations to operate in Mindanao, which 
attracted transnational corporations to put up agricultural businesses, which required 
hectares of land. The policies not only dispossessed the Moros and Lumads of their 
ancestral lands, but created a deep sense of frustration among them.  
Prior to the granting of independence in 1946, some of the Moro leaders 
preferred to be integrated into the Philippines while others Moro leaders protested the 
idea. Those that opposed the idea and submitted a document to the U.S. government 
that they should not be part of the Philippines, and sought to be a separate state. Moros 
staged successive uprisings, which are usually violent, throughout the US colonial 
period. Moros resisted the systematized land-grabbing and their perceived suppression 
to their way of life.  
4.3. Post-independence 
 
Post-independence governments continued to encourage the poor from other 
parts of the Philippines to settle in Mindanao. Competition for land worsened between 
the Moros and the new settlers which led them to establish their own private armies to 
defend their properties. The indigenous Mindanao population felt displaced in their 
own land. The Muslims were accustomed to a communal form of ownership and they 
have their own Islamic laws and sanctions.  They resented that the governments had 
                                                        
27 C. A. Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: St. Mary's Publishing, 1978), p. 113. 
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imposed policies that conflicted with their traditions. Furthermore, increased 
competition between the groups have created animosity among the people.  
 
4.3.1. Ferdinand Marcos Regime (1965-1986) 
 
In the late 1960s, Muslim population decreased from three-fourths to a quarter of 
the whole Mindanao population. On March 18, 1968, allegedly, between fourteen to 
sixty eight  Filipino Muslim military trainees are massacred
28
 by soldiers of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), after the trainees refused to fight fellow Muslims in 
the then disputed territory of Sabah
29
.  However, evidence points strongly to the 
conclusion that this massacre never actually happened. In fact, after conducting his 
own investigation on the matter, then opposition leader Senator Ninoy Aquino 
categorically proclaimed the entire incident as a hoax in a speech to the legislature ten 
days after the alleged incident
30
. Nevertheless, news of the alleged incident roused the 
Muslim student community in Manila and voiced long-held sentiments of 
disenfranchisement among Muslims back in Mindanao. Syed Islam argues that the use 
of force and other socioeconomic and political measures of suppression created the 
opportunity for minority elites to exploit long-held sentiments of alienation to gain 
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 Although this supposed massacre mobilized the Muslim 
Filipinos in the 1970s, the groups are rather silent about what is supposed to be a 
defining moment in their histories. Nur Misuari, went on to form the militant Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) which aimed to liberate the Moro homeland. The 
MNLF attracted the support of a number of Filipino Muslims. 
The MNLF had also created an armed wing, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), 
consisting of militant Muslim youths and they engaged in guerilla warfare against the 
Philippines Army. President Marcos declared martial law in 1972 in the Philippines 
and cited the existence of armed conflict between Muslims and Christians and a 
Muslim secessionist movement in Mindanao
32
. MNLF continued its activities 
underground during the martial law. Thousands of people lost their lives and property 
in the armed struggle in Mindanao. In spite of the Marcos regime's tactics, the 
consequences of the armed struggle aroused the concern of the OIC countries over the 
conditions of Muslims in the Philippines. 
 The MNLF sought the support of Muslims in other countries and conveyed 
their grievances to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). A delegation of 
foreign ministers from Islamic states
33
 met with the Marcos government regarding the 
situations of Muslims in Mindanao. The involvement of the foreign states eventually 
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led to the signing of an agreement on December 23, 1976 in Tripoli, Libya. The Tripoli 
Agreement included provisions for the formation of an autonomous region consisting 
of 9 cities and 13 provinces in Mindanao. The MNLF had to reduce their demand for 
complete independence and instead settle for their homeland to be part of the Republic 
of the Philippines. However, the granting of autonomy is still subject to the Philippine 
constitutional process. A referendum was required to determine which areas should be 
encompass n the autonomous region. The MNLF opposed the terms which resulted to 
the collapse of the ceasefire. Misuari was challenged to the chairmanship of the MNLF 
due to the failure of the Tripoli Agreement. Hashim Salamat, displeased of Misuari’s 
leadership, separated from the group and established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF). In other areas of Mindanao another insurgency was arising. The Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CPP) National Democratic Front (NDF) was operating its 
fronts in Mindanao.  
4.3.2. Corazon Aquino Regime (1986-1992) 
 
In the 1986, the dictatorship of President Marcos ended due to the public 
demand for a democratic government. When President Corazon Aquino assumed office 
in 1986, a new Constitution was created which established the Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The MNLF was dissatisfied with this as only 4 provinces 
were included in the autonomy, and not the 13 provinces and 9 cities as indicated in the 
Tripoli Agreement. The MNLF called on the other factions to unite and continue their 




Also unsatisfied with the autonomy, Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani called on 
the radical members of the MNLF who were prepared to continue to fight for an 
independent Islamic state. He then established the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in 
1991. President Corazon Aquino in 1991 issued a notice for the U.S. to leave the U.S.’ 
biggest bases overseas which were in Subic in Clark in Luzon island of Philippines. 
 
 
4.3.3. Fidel Ramos Regime (1992-1998) 
 
The Philippine Government adopted the Peace Process Policy after it made a 
dialogue in identifying what causes conflict and insurgency in the country. President 
Ramos then issued his policies addressing the conflict during his presidency. The 
President created the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) and issued Executive Order 125 
that sought to adopt a peaceful negotiations with the rebels. At the time, insurgences by 
the CPP, MNLF, and MILF were happening simultaneously in Mindanao.  
 
 In 1995, the ASG fired upon residents of Ipil municipality in Mindanao and 
took hostages and then burned the town’s center.
34
 The Ipil raid was a crucial moment 
for the ASG because it led the group’s designation to the Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations by the US State Department. Meanwhile on June 21, 1993, the 
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Philippine government entered a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
35
 with the US as 
part of a comprehensive bilateral security arrangement. The SOFA established the 
rights and privileges of both U.S. civilian and military personnel stationed in the 
country, and it cites the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 as the basis of the agreement.  
 
In September 1996, the MNLF signed a peace deal with the GRP. The 
Agreement provided for the establishment the Southern Philippine Council for Peace 
and Development (SPCPD) which would be responsible for the supervision and 
coordination of the development projects in the Special Zone for Peace and 
Development (SZOPAD)
36
. The special zone covered all the areas originally specified 
in the Tripoli Agreement. Furthermore, it was agreed that in 1999, a plebiscite would 
be conducted for a referendum whether the covered provinces would agree to be 
included in the ARMM. One province and city was added to the ARMM.  
 
The death of ASG leader in 1998, made a turn in ideology to general 
kidnappings, murders and robberies. In 2000, the ASG forces kidnapped 21 foreigners 
in a resort in Sabah, Malaysia. The ASG released the hostages after the governments of 
France, Germany, and Finland paid the ransom. On May 2000, the group again 
kidnapped 20 people, including three Americans, in a resort in Palawan, Philippines. 
One of these Americans was beheaded by the ASG on June 2001. A Christian 
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evangelist couple, was still held by the group and demanded USD 2 million in 
exchange for them.  
 
4.3.4. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Regime (1988-2001) 
 
 At the time President Estrada was elected, MNLF was no longer considered a 
threat as most of its leaders joined the government as elected officials. However, the 
threat was stemming from the MILF, led by Hashim Salamat. Inconsistent with the 
peaceful initiatives of his predecessors, the President declared an “all-out war” policy 
in 2000 and ordered a military campaign to defeat the insurgency. The military assault 
appeared successful, however, it failed to crush the MILF which chose to avoid direct 
confrontation by splintering into smaller groups and hiding in the remote areas of the 
region (Shiavo Campo and Judd, 2005)
37
. The GRP together with US armed forces 
employed military operations in pursuit of the ASG.  The President’s all-out-war also 
included the ASG, which at the time was known for its kidnap-for-ransom activities. 
President Estrada’s policies on the insurgencies did not make distinctions between the 
groups’ motivations for engagement. The armed encounters in 2000 had displaced an 
estimate of 900,000.
38
 More resources were spent on the war providing humanitarian 
needs of the civilians caught in the armed conflict.  
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4.3.5. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Regime (2001-2010) 
 
  The President Macapagal-Arroyo regime issued Administrative Order (AO) 
No. 03 that adopted a peace process policy. The AO prioritized the peace process in 
dealing with insurgence groups, particularly the MILF which was included in the 
former president’s all-out war in 2000. The administration emphasized that peace is a 
process, as it involves the transformation of the whole person, the whole community 




At the outset, the administration declared a peaceful policy towards the MILF. 
However, the government momentarily abandoned its policy in 2003 when the a 
military attack was launched in MILF controlled territories in pursuit of “criminal 
elements”. In the same year, the GRP and MILF, under Chairman Murad Ebrahim
40
, 
made a ceasefire agreement that led to peace talks together with the Malaysian 
government.  
 
However, in a turn of events after the 9/11 attacks on the US, President 
Macapagal-Arroyo pledged support to the U.S. government in its global 
counterterrorism efforts. In return, the US pledged on a substantial package of aid and 
assistance to the Philippines. Recognizing the Philippines’ role in promoting regional 
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security and combating global terrorism, President Bush designated the Philippines as 




4.3.6. Benigno Simeon Aquino III Regime (2010-2016) 
 
The administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III formulated its National 
Security Policy that focused on good governance, delivery of basic services, economic 
reconstruction and sustainable development, and security sector reform. The security 
sector reform is anchored on the emerging idea that soldiers can be peacebuilders, and 
the human security approach. Human security approach goes beyond the traditional 
meaning of security, which not only includes physical safety, but also economic and 
social wellbeing, respect for dignity, and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  
President Benigno Aquino strongly supported the passage into law 
the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). The BBL was based on 
the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) — the peace settlement 
between the GRP and the MILF which aimed to establish a parliamentary political 
system that will replace the current ARMM. The BBL failed to get support from the 
Philippine Congress because of it was deemed to contain unconstitutional provisions.  
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V. USAID in the Mindanao Conflict   
 
 
The US has been a long-time actor of the Philippines’ self-determination. 
USAID has been implementing major assistance efforts in the region for almost two 
decades. Current U.S. involvement in the Philippines’ security is based on the Mutual 
Defense Treaty of 1951. Military and foreign aid involvement are amongst the scope of 
this treaty. There are few USAID missions wherein specific strategic objectives in 
addressing the conflict, one of them is the Philippines. The mission identified this 
specific objective after the 9/11 attacks, their supposed link to the Al Qaeda. USAID 
has supported various programs in Mindanao on development objectives with the aim 
of reducing militarized clashed and localized violence in Southern Philippines. Their 
projects were multi-sectoral, involving economic growth, education, good governance, 
and energy. The US has also assisted the Philippines in its military pursuits against the 
ASG and participated in the peace talks with the separatist MILF. 
 
5.1. Before 9/11 
 
The USAID has already initiated programs in Mindanao since the 1970s. In 
USAID’s Philippines Assistance Strategy Statement 1991-1995
42
, its projects in 
Mindanao were focused on the route “rationalization” in East Mindanao and sought to 
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address the franchising practices of the Land Transportation Office which “not only 
pose an enforcement problem but are also economically unsound.” The other project 
known as the Mindanao Area Development, a USD35 million projects, was for the 
development of roads of the General Santos Area in Mindanao.  The goal for the 
Philippine Assistance Strategy was broad-based, sustainable economic growth through 





 1992 marked the end of the lease of the U.S. bases located in Subic and Clark. 
During the Marcos administration in 1966, the Ramos-Rusk Agreement was signed. 
The Agreement reduced the lease from 99 years to 25 years, and could only be 
extended through renegotiation. The Philippine Senate refused to sign the Philippine-
American Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security, that would extend the lease 
of the U.S. bases.
44
 The U.S. withdrew its forces and their security relations was only 
bound by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. military bases was the major 
concern of the U.S.-Philippines relations at the time. 
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After the U.S. left its bases, the USAID mission focused on the Mindanao’s 
social and economic development, and reducing the conflict. USAID’s assistance were 
targeted to MNLF communities as part of the peace dividends in the Peace Agreement 
of 1996. They launched the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM)
45
 which carried 
out activities intended to ensure that the flow of investment, public and private, into 
Mindanao particularly the South Central Mindanao or the SOCCSKSARGEN region. 
One of its projects, the Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP) aimed at 
assisting former MNLF combatants to make the transition from fighters to productive 
farmers and fishermen. While it was originally aimed at 2,000 former MNLF 
combatants, 5941 former combatants were assisted. The ELAP assistance also included 
other 19,000 farmers/fishermen
46
 who are in the conflict-afflicted areas. USAID 
expanded the scope of it assistance in other conflict-affected areas in 1995. It extended 
into other areas in Mindanao that are affected by insurgency and even criminality. In 
September 1997, USAID signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Southern 
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) which outlined a new 
program of support focused upon conflict-affected areas and neighboring provinces in 
Mindanao. Named the SZOPAD Accelerated Enterprise Development (SZAED) 
Program, it was designed to help accelerate economic progress in Mindanao's Special 
Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), and thereby help assure that peace in the 
area was maintained. The SZOPAD is the portion of Mindanao that historically had a 
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significant Muslim population and includes 13 of its 25 provinces. In August 1998, the 
Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program contract was amended to 
incorporate the new SZAED component. From 1995 to 2002, USAID expanded its 
assistance efforts to cover all of Mindanao through its GEM-1 project amounting to 
USD 22.3million. 
 
Those who were dismayed with the MNLF’s settlement with the government 
broke away and formed the MILF and the ASG. In the 1990s, the ASG had staged, 
bombings, executions, and kidnappings mainly against Filipino Christians on the 
Western Mindanao areas. Two American missionaries were killed in Zamboanga City 
when ASG launched a grenade in 04 April 1991.
47
 After the AFP killed ASG leader 
Abubakr Janjalani, the group’s operations were aimed at foreigners with the aim of 
collecting ransom. In 2000, the ASG forces kidnapped 21 foreigners in a resort in 
Sabah, Malaysia. The ASG released the hostages after the governments of France, 
Germany, and Finland paid the ransom. On May 2000, the group again kidnapped 20 
people, including three Americans, from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. One 
of these Americans was beheaded by the ASG on June 2001. A Christian evangelist 
couple, was still held by the group and demanded USD 2 million in exchange for them. 
Hostage-taking and attacks by the ASG and led the Manila government to accept the 
U.S. proposed assistance of the deployment of a thousand of its troops who provided 
training and high-tech support to the Philippine troops, under the auspices of 
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. In the rules of engagement (ROE) for the Balikatan exercise US troops 
will have a non-combat role for the operations against the ASG, and can operate within 
a geographical limitation in Basilan and Zamboanga.  
 
5.2. After 9/11 
 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US launched the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) which resulted the expansion of USAID’s role in the Philippines. Philippine 
president Macapagal-Arroyo pledged support to the U.S. government in global 
counterterrorism efforts, and the two governments reached agreement on a package of 
aid and assistance. USAID’s programs are beyond the conventional goals of 
development and designed more explicitly to alleviate some of the sources of terrorism 
and violence like the ASG. The US continued to demobilize and reintegrate the forces 
of the MNLF into the society through their projects. The GRP through President 
Macapagal-Arroyo made a close partnership with the US Government on security 
issues. GEM was now considered to be the USAID’s flagship activity in Mindanao. 
Due to the success of the program, it was continued for five years more as the GEM-2, 
with a more expanded scope. The GEM-2 contract costs USD83.6 million, and it was 
USAID/Philippines’ single largest activity. The program covered a wide range of 
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activities, of which the largest were infrastructure developments
49
, others were aimed 
at improving business practices, governance, and improving education. The GEM-2 
program’s primary objectives were: (1) to help bring about and consolidate peace in 
Mindanao and (2) to accelerate economic growth in Mindanao and help ensure that as 
many people as possible, including members of cultural minorities, benefit from the 
economic growth. Significant activities, such as introducing computer and Internet 
education and working in joint efforts with parent-teacher-community associations to 
establish school libraries and science laboratories, were also part of the program. 
 
In 2002, approximately 1,300 U.S. military forces were deployed in Mindanao 
as part of the Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEFP). Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) is part of the GWOT, launched by US President George W. Bush on 
October 2001, when the US and British forces have started airstrikes in Afghanistan 
which aimed to target Al Qaeda and Taliban. Balikatan 02-1 was the first phase of 
OEFP. The first phase of OEFP was dedicated on the island of Basilan, where ASG 
was keeping its American hostages. The American forces deployed did not directly 
engage in combat, but were limited to training and guiding the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) to better fight the ASG. The US military trained and advised 15 
Philippine Army and Marine Corps battalions in Basilan. The U.S. forces also carried 
out extensive civil-military operations over the island. These activities included new 
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water wells, community health infrastructures that has increased civilian support for 
the US-Philippine operations against the terrorist threat.  In spite of the operation’s 
success in reducing the threat in Basilan, the U.S. forces wanted to increase its training 




The Military Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA) 2002 has revived US 
presence in the region which had significantly dwindled when the US Bases were 
closed in 1992. In 2003, the Philippines became a non-NATO major ally of the US, 
eased the flow of military support between the two. The US presence enabled the 
Philippine government to fight the rebel groups with its improved military capabilities. 
The United States has identified the New People’s Army, a communist group, and the 
ASG in its list of terrorist organizations
51
. However, the MILF was not declared even 
when reports on its supposed links with Al-Qaeda and JI had surfaced. The GRP at the 
time was in the process of an interim peace agreement with the MILF which may have 
affected US’ decision on the matter. 
 
According to the USAID/Philippines Strategic Plan for 2005-2009
52
, “foreign 
assistance is now more carefully targeted to support global and regional objectives 
such as combating terrorism and promoting regional stability and security.” The goal 
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of the new Strategy was “enhanced security and accelerated progress towards 
sustainable, equitable growth through improved governance, capacities and economic 
opportunities,”
53
 all in support of USAID/Philippines’ longer-term development 
objective of sustainable, equitable prosperity and peace. The Strategy pursued five 
program areas: (1) economic governance; (2) family planning and health; (3) 
environment and energy; (4) education; and (5) conflict reduction in Mindanao and 
other areas. Each of the Strategic Objectives (SOs) in these areas highlighted assistance 
in Mindanao and particularly to its conflict-affected areas. 
 
In 2005, JSOTFP moved south to Camp General Basilio Navarro in 
Zamboanga, until the end of the OEFP. JSOTFP applied the same approach it used in 
Basilan giving emphasis on CMO. In addition, U.S. SOSF expanded its advisory 
activities from Western to Central Mindanao. New joint activities included maritime 
operations and training, and equipping of naval special operations units. In 2006, the 
ASG leader, Khaddafy Janjalani, was killed in an encounter in Sulu. This signified a 
success for the JOTFP operations reducing the ASG’s operations. The AFP shifted 
their efforts from combat operations to CMO approach, which the US had employed in 
Basilan. 
 





In USAID’s 2005 Annual report
54
, the USAID focuses on the Mindanao 
conflict. Their goals were to reduce conflict and enhance stability, encourage peace and 
regional security. USAID’s Education program, in particular, aimed to address the 
political and social marginalization of Muslim and other conflict-affected areas in 
Mindanao. In the same document, USAID identifies its activities to contribute to their 
national and regional stability and global interests.  
 
According to the report
55
 for the USAID on their projects in Mindanao, the 
USAID conducted a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) for the purposes of 
developing their 2005-2009 country partnership strategy.  Further, that the CVA 
examined the current conflicts in Mindanao, its potential for future conflict, and the 
opportunities for USAID to address those challenges. USAID used the 2003 CVA as 
the point of departure for their new country strategies on the basis of the conflict. 
However, the 2005-2009 Strategy only highlights the ASG and the CPP-NPA as the 
drivers of conflict. The 2005 - 2009 Strategy had also called for another conflict 
assessment of areas outside Mindanao. Further, the strategy recognizes the major 
implications in the role of USAID after the 9/11 and the subsequent GWOT.  This 
identification of their “key role” resulted to new programs for the USAID/Philippines, 
including Strategic Objective 12 (SO12): Enhancing security by helping to reduce 
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conflict in Mindanao and other areas vulnerable to violence replaced the earlier special 
objective for addressing conflict in Mindanao (Sp03) and intensified USAID’s focus 
on addressing conflict in the Philippines. The new SO was intended to not only address 
the conflict in Mindanao abut it also paved way for USAID to intervene outside 
Mindanao where “poverty and social injustice could create fertile ground for organized 
violence and terrorism.” USAID assistance is now targeted to support the GWOT as a 
priority objective. While the activities under SO12 sought to directly address conflict 
other SOs were also envisioned to complement activities in the conflict affected areas. 
Other SOs were identified in line with the SO12 that was aimed to reduce poverty that 
would address root causes of terrorism and violence. USAID mission in the Philippines 
has incorporated a strategic objective specifically designed to address conflict. 
 
In 2008, USAID sought to evaluate the accomplishments of its programs in 
reducing the sources of Mindanao’s conflicts and in building peace to guide 
USAID/Philippines in its strategy and programs. The evaluation done by the Coffey 
International Development group, suggests that there may be a disproportionate 
emphasis on socio-economic factors and not enough on improving governance and 
addressing the deficiencies of the weak state. Further, they suggested that the conflicts 
between communities, ethno-linguistic groups and political entities, as well as conflict 
over ideological and political aspirations cannot usually be solved through socio-
economic interventions alone. Thus, they recommended that USAID should shift more 
of its resources toward perhaps less visible but equally important, medium-term efforts 
39 
 
to build the supporting social and governance institutions and processes that will allow 
local leveraging of those earlier investments, such as by mobilizing communities more 
actively to counteract the influence of predominant local elites.  
 
According to the FY2009 Strategic Plan of the U.S. Mission to the Philippines, 
USAID’s continuing efforts in Mindanao contribute directly to the overall USG 
priority of defeating terrorists and fostering peace through a multifaceted strategy to 
eliminate terrorists; deny them sanctuary; strengthen security forces; and promote 
peace and development. Approximately 60 percent of USAID’s assistance to the 
Philippines is concentrated in Mindanao with particular focus on the conflict-affected 
areas to help demonstrate the tangible economic and social benefits of peace and 
security.  
 
In 2011, GRP and USG joined in a new Partnership for Growth (PFG)
56
, a 
combined effort by all elements of the USG to work with the GRP to transform the 
country by addressing its most serious constraints to development and growth. In 
planning the PFG, the two countries conducted a joint analysis which concluded that 
the key constraints to growth in the Philippines are a lack of fiscal space (insufficient 
public revenues for investment and services) and weak governance, and that underlying 
both is pervasive corruption. USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy 
                                                        
56




does not address all of the problems facing the Philippines, but rather focuses more 
narrowly on the most critical challenges that must be met for the Philippines to become 
a more stable, prosperous and well governed nation. These challenges correspond 
closely to the key constraints to economic growth identified in the PFG Strategy and its 
Joint Country Action Plan (JCAP). USAID has specified 3 Direct Objectives (DO) in 
achieving these goals: DO1: Broad‐ Based and Inclusive Growth Accelerated and 
Sustained; DO2: Peace and Stability in Conflict‐ Affected Areas in Mindanao 
Improved; and DO3: Environmental Resilience Improved. These three objectives are 
envisioned to better address the interconnected development challenges facing the 
Philippines and to increase the country’s prospects for long‐ term stability and 
prosperity. The overall development hypothesis is that if USAID improves economic 
competitiveness (by strengthening weak governance and expanding fiscal space) and 
strengthens human capital (through improved health and education), USAID’s strategy 
will contribute substantially to accelerating and sustaining broad‐ based and inclusive 
growth in the Philippines. Such growth, combined with enhanced peace and stability in 
conflict‐ affected areas of Mindanao and improved environmental resilience, will 
together contribute to the creation of a more stable, prosperous and well governed 
nation. 
 
The Mission’s previous large Mindanao program (nearly 60% of the budget) 
emphasized investments in economic infrastructure, agricultural development, 
education, and direct service provision covering the entire island. The DO2 in the new 
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strategy represents only about 10% of the Mission’s budget compared to the 60% that 
was channeled into these programs. DO2 concentrates on strengthening local 
governance and civic engagement to reduce conflict and violence in just six areas that 
pose the greatest risk of international terrorism. The same conflict‐ affected areas that 
suffer from weak governance are also racked by lawlessness and retaliatory violence 
between and within clans and ethnic groups, creating conditions conducive to the 
growth of criminal, insurgent and terrorist groups. The Country Development 
Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) 2012-2016 cites that research has shown that 
communities (and voluntary organizations within them) can play an important role in 
advocating peace and mitigating conflict (Torres 2007). This hypothesis is what drives 
USAID’s new emphasis on strengthening civic engagement by inculcating ethical 
behavior; increasing peoples’ sense of responsibility for community welfare; and 
expanding the capacity of community members (male and female) and their 
organizations to peacefully resolve conflicts, advocate change, improve service 
delivery, and enhance their overall quality of life. USAID will focus, in particular, on 
preparing the next generation of young leaders by helping them develop a social 
consciousness that demands more accountable governance. USAID’s targeted civic 
knowledge, skills and attitudes to make people more responsible and ethical members 
of their community and to better engage them in addressing community issues. This 
will empower community members, including women, to be real players in peace and 
development, strengthening the social contract between individuals, the community 




USAID has implemented projects and activities in infrastructure, agriculture, 
education, governance, health, democracy, environment, and reintegration of former 
combatants. The activities are carried out across Mindanao, but was concentrated in the 
ARMM. USAID viewed that through improving social and economic development it 
would lead to reducing the sources of its conflicts. USAID’s approach in addressing 
insurgency and conflict is through creation of conditions of peace, but, it has also 
















VI. Analysis of USAID Interventions in Mindanao 
The distribution of ODA is categorized by sector which is based on the OECD-
DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) purpose code. DAC members, including the 
United States, categorize their development assistance depending on its purpose/s 
based on guidance provided in technical data and information found in the purpose 
code list, which defines the term purpose of development assistance refers to the sector 
of the recipient’s economy that the development assistance activity is designed to 
assist.
57
 This research considered Development assistance flows for governance and 
peace are considered to be those labelled under the “150” DAC sector code 
Government and civil society. This sector has two sub-codes which are Government 
and civil society, general and Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security, 
which are further divided to 17 subcategories (see table 1).  
 
Table 1 Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Purpose Codes on Governance and Peace58 
DAC 5 CODE CRS CODE DESCRIPTION 
150  GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY  
151  Government and civil society, general  
 15110  Public sector policy and administrative management  
 15111  Public finance management  
 15112  Decentralization and support to subnational government  
 15113  Anti-corruption organizations and institutions  
 15130  Legal and judicial development  
 15150  Democratic participation and civil society  
 15151  Elections  
                                                        
57OECD-DAC. Purpose Code Sector Classification.  
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/purposecodessectorclassi fication.htm. 
Accessed on 29 September 2016. 
58
 OECD-DAC. OECD-DAC and CRS Code Lists. http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-




 15152  Legislatures and political parties  
 15153  Media and free flow of information  
 15160  Human rights  
 15170  Women’s equality organizations and institutions  
152   Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security  
 15210  Security system management and reform  
 15220  Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution  
 15230  Participation in international peacekeeping operations  
 15240  Reintegration and small arms light weapons control  
 15250  Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war  




Figure 1USAID Disbursements for Mindanao 2001-2015 
 
The supposed links of groups in Mindanao to Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah 
have prompted the US to include the Philippines in its War on Terror. After the 9/11 
attacks, a significant increase of 163% from 2001 to 2002 was disbursed to address the 
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Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTFP). In 2005-2009 the 
USAID/Philippines Strategic Plan explicitly stated that USAID foreign assistance was 
targeted to combat terrorism and promoting regional stability and security. 
Disbursements for Mindanao significantly decreased by 50% from 2007 to 2008.   
From 2001-2015, more than USD 600 million has been disbursed to Mindanao to 
address the conflict.  
 
 











Figure 3 Projects by Implemented by Implementing Agency 
 
Although USAID has the most implemented projects, in terms of disbursed 
amount however, in terms of actual money disbursed the Department of Defense 
(DOD) has the most totaling to over USD 462 million or 72% of the total aid to 
Mindanao. Throughout the USAID’s assistance, military component was consistently 
higher than economic assistance for the whole studies period except 2014. Examining 
the assistance category further reveals that it was only in years 2001 and 2007 that 
military and economic assistance had the less gap. It is important to note that all 
disbursements were either project type or technical assistance. In the Partnership for 
Growth 2011 agreement, while bilateral consultations have identified key constraints to 











governance, and corruption, the US has still focused on improving Peace and Stability 




Figure 4 USAID Economic & Military Assistance 
Military has consistently been the prioritized sector in addressing the conflict. 
Almost 75% of the aid was disbursed for military purposes. The US significantly 
decreased its military assistance, starting 2011 citing “Our partnership with the 
Philippine security forces has been successful in drastically reducing the capabilities of 
                                                        
59 Philippines – United States. Partnership for Growth Joint Country Action Plan 















domestic and transnational terrorist groups in the Philippines”
 60
, Kurt Hoyer, the U.S. 
Embassy Press Attaché, told the Associated Press in 2014.The JSOTFP was concluded 
in 2014, thus, in 2015 no military assistance was disbursed to Mindanao. Although 
Janjalani, the ASG leader was killed in 2006, military spending still increased in 2007, 
and continued to be dominant until 2012. 
 
 
Figure 5 Distribution of Aid by Purpose 
 
                                                        
60Lozada, Bong. Associated Press. US scales down anti-terror unit in PH, officials 
clarify. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/107187/us-scales-down-anti-terror-
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In sum, more than USD 600 million has been disbursed from 2001-2015 to 
support the peace and conflict reduction. Security system and management reform, 
which is largely composed of military aid, accounted for 72% of the total disbursed aid. 
While civil peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution is 25% of the total 
disbursements, this sector however also has significant amount allotted to its military 
component. Other purposes of aid for Mindanao includes Anti-corruption 
organizations and institutions, Decentralization and support to subnational government, 
Democratic participation and civil society, Elections, Legal and judicial development, 
Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war. Most military assistance is 
administered by the Department of Defense (DOD) in conjunction with the Office of 
Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department. The Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency is the primary DOD body responsible for foreign military financing and 
training programs. 
 
Analysis of the data also shows that USAID prioritizes project-type 
interventions. Almost 95% of the development assistance for governance and peace is 
disbursed via projects, while the remaining are technical assistance. Project type aid 
carries the risk of crowding out social expenditure that the Philippine government 
would have undertaken in the absence of the USAID’s intervention. The USAID has 





Figure 6 Channels of Disbursed Aid 
 
 
For the whole US aid flows for Mindanao, 45% projects were channeled 
through enterprises. And of these enterprises, 94% are US enterprises.
61
 In terms of the 
disbursed amount, US Enterprises got only 21% share. On the other hand, the 28% 
projects were channeled through the US government and 75% of the total amount 
disbursed. For the ODA channeled through NGOs and civil society amounted to 25%, 
which comprised of mostly United States based groups.
62
 NGOs are crucial in conflict 
area interventions since they can provide non-military approaches in a sensitive 
environment. NGOs can provide important services such as preventive action and 
                                                        
61
 90 out of 95 projects channeled through Enterprises were labelled “Enterprises-United States”, 
while the remaining 5 were labelled “Enterprises-Non United States”. 
62
 43 out of 53 categorized under NGOs were labelled as “NGO-United States”, and the 
remaining were labelled as “NGO-Non United States”. 
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conflict resolution, development assistance, humanitarian relief, and institution-
building. NGOs are critical can maintain neutrality despite political, ethnic, or religious 
affiliation. However, as most of the NGOs that operated were from the US, it may be 
difficult to sustain their neutrality since they work closely with their government to 
carry out their activities in a complex conflict situation. The US appears to have low 
harmonization with other aid providers, opting to be independent in its affairs in 
dealing with the conflict. Only one project was recorded to with a multilateral 
institution namely the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
 
 
Figure 7 Conflict Incidence in Mindanao by Type 63 
1- state-based conflict; 2- non-state conflict; 3- one-sided violence 
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 Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Program. 

















The Uppsala Peace and Conflict Program defines Non-state The use of armed 
force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of 
a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. While state-based 
armed conflicts are the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government. Non-state conflict are the use of armed force by the government of 
a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 
deaths in a year. On average, 105 conflict incidences occurred annually from 2001 to 
2015. The prevailing type of conflict has been state-based with 1,365 incidences and 
one-sided violence comprises of 201 incidences, while the lowest share was non-state 
conflict.   
 
Aid providers who equate their insecurity with underdevelopment in places 
with ongoing conflict, it is logical that international responses should address the 
internal processes that had sustained the conflict. In 2001-2015, most of U.S. aid was 
spent on Foreign Military Financing Program. Although USAID has established a code 
of conduct
64
 on working on crises and conflict it may have also resulted to a 
standardization of their interventions.  
 
                                                        
64
 Over 30 publications regarding Conflict Assessment Frameworks, Conflict Technical 
Publications, and Conflict Toolkits are in the USAID website. USAID, 
https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications. 
Accessed on 05 October 2016. 
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The US had framed the Mindanao conflict as simply a Muslim conflict and the 
latter group providing a hub for extremists in pursuing jihad. With the U.S’s global war 
on terror, the conflict in Mindanao focuses on the ASG’s activities rather than the 
whole conflict crisis. The ASG is just one of the major actors in the subnational 
conflict in Mindanao. The MILF, MNLF, and clan feuds are other conflict actors that 
are significant to the conflict situation, and their political dynamics directly affects any 
developmental goals that are envisioned to address the conflict. 
 
In the analysis of the continuing conflict, it is imperative to adhere to historical 
analysis. Colonial and post-colonial histories reveals undeniable relevance to the nature 
of conflict. Thus, it is necessary that address those events/themes that arose in order to 
achieve peace. Similar issues have occurred repeatedly throughout history i.e., policies 
that were disruptive to the way of life of the Mindanao people (including Lumads, 
Moros, and Christians), their displacement, and depleted access to their resources 
Moreover, their history of being forcibly ceded to the US through the Treaty of Paris. 
The Moros and the Lumads were coexisting, even before the Spanish came to 
Mindanao. Furthermore, the Spanish never fully controlled Mindanao. Their history of 
resisting the colonizers were separate to the revolution in the Central and Northern 
Philippines. This history together with the politics of identity must be taken into 
account in order to understand the conflict and design appropriate interventions. In a 
highly sensitive environment, all interventions should be critically examined in its 
appropriateness, whether it addresses the roots of conflict. Moreover, as discussed in 
54 
 
the previous chapters, the conflict can be framed in a political economy framework in 
understanding its nature. From the history of the creation of the “Philippine state” 
together with the processes that led to land dispossession and displacement of the 
people. The Mindanao people’s autonomy on the political economy of their land has 
been continuously restrained throughout history.  
 
 
Figure 8 Poverty Incidence among Families in Mindanao Region (%) 
 
The internationalization of the security situation has further obscured the roots 
of conflict in Mindanao. The GWOT framework adopted against the Islamist 
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weakness of the democratic institutions and other issues have been overlooked which 
is evident on the funded projects. Most funding went to Military spending, particularly 
on funding foreign military spending. The aid flows are too politically motivated to act 
as an instrument of economic development in the already politically-sensitive conflict 
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Figure 9 Correlation Tests: Conflict, Economic and Military Aid Flows 
 
The research tested for correlation between conflict incidences and economic 
aid flows from 2001-2015 and the same was done between conflict incidences and 
military aid flows. It was found that -0.52 statistical correlation was found between 
economic aid and conflict incidences. This indicates a strong negative relationship 
between the two variables. The study acknowledged that   there is always the 
possibility that a different variable influenced the results. However, and apparent 
relationship between the two could possibly exist, as Economic aid flows variable 
increase as the conflict incidence decrease. On the other hand, military aid flows and 
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The study showed that through significant amount of aid that USAID provided, 
it was apparent that there was more incentive for the Philippines to cooperate to US’ 
interests rather than its own. The US had provided significant amount of military aid to 
capacitate the Philippines in counterterrorism so that it does not have to fight on its 
own soil. Cooperation under the security dilemma has prompted the US to delegate to 
the Philippines its fight against terrorism. The US provided aid primarily because its 
own interests of security was threatened and not because of the Philippines security 
threats. This validates the literature review on the increased unilateralism of US aid 
after 9/11.  
 
 Mindanao is clearly suffering from weak institutions and thus needs improve 
governance, on the other hand, the US assisted the Philippines through military 
centered assistance. The US acted due to the terrorist activity that was threatening their 
own interests. The US narrowly framed the conflict as a terrorist threat, which as 
discussed was far more complicated with multiple actors. Moreover, although the 
USAID conducted a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment, it still pursued the threats that 
are directed to them and remained unresponsive to the Philippines’ needs. Although 
operating in conflict areas is challenging, the 2005 Paris Declaration principles serve as 
a good starting point of aid engagement. However, the principles of ownership, 
58 
 
alignment, harmonization was clearly weak between the US and the Philippines as 
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